Graham probe White House on bathroom breaks

Senator Graham is turning the attack in Benghazi into a political game instead of a matter of National Security. He didn't want answers on how the White House was wrong about sending troops into Iraq. Didn't want answers on how Osama was allowed to leave Afghanistan and live for years in Pakistan. Didn't want to know much at all including the other attack on September 11th that killed thousands and caused two wars.

Graham said

“In a constitutional democracy, we need to know what our commander in chief was doing at a time of great crisis, and this White House has been stonewalling the Congress, and I’m going to do everything I can to get to the bottom of this so we’ll learn from our mistakes and hold this president accountable for what I think is tremendous disengagement at a time of national security crisis,” he said.

In case you forgot, Graham didn't think it was important to ask questions after 9-11 when the planes were in the air and allowed to fly at will after two planes hit the Twin Towers.

Congress did not hold hearings right away after that but after holding hearing after hearing on September 11, 2012, they want a minute by minute account of what President Obama was doing. Where was he? When did he get the news? What was he wearing? Was he watching TV and what was he watching? How many times did he go to the bathroom? Was it Scott or Charmin?

The worst part of all of this is the media allows him to just say whatever he wants to without ever asking him what he is trying to prove. Four people were killed and yes, there should have been hearings, which were done. Graham is one of the biggest reasons the American Public no longer has faith in the Congress. They never seem to focus on what matters to all of us. This is what happened after the mega 9-11 and it came a year later.

JOINT INQUIRY INTO INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY ACTIVITIES
BEFORE AND AFTER THE TERRORIST ATTACKS OF SEPTEMBER 11, 2001
REPORT OF THE U.S. SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND U.S. HOUSE PERMANENT SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE TOGETHER WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS DECEMBER 2002

CONCLUSION – FACTUAL FINDINGS
In short, for a variety of reasons, the Intelligence Community failed to capitalize on both the individual and collective significance of available information that appears relevant to the events of September 11. As a result, the Community missed opportunities to disrupt the September 11th plot by denying entry to or detaining would-be hijackers; to at least try to unravel the plot through surveillance and other investigative work within the United States; and, finally, to generate a heightened state of alert and thus harden the homeland against attack.

No one will ever know what might have happened had more connections been drawn between these disparate pieces of information. We will never definitively know to what extent the Community would have been able and willing to exploit fully all the opportunities that may have emerged. The important point is that the Intelligence Community, for a variety of reasons, did not bring together and fully appreciate a range of information that could have greatly enhanced its chances of uncovering and preventing Usama Bin Ladin’s plan to attack these United States on September 11, 2001.

SYSTEMIC FINDINGS
Our review of the events surrounding September 11 has revealed a number of systemic weaknesses that hindered the Intelligence Community’s counterterrorism efforts before September 11. If not addressed, these weaknesses will continue to undercut U.S. counterterrorist efforts. In order to minimize the possibility of attacks like September 11 in the future, effective solutions to those problems need to be developed and fully implemented as soon as possible [page xvi]

1. Finding: Prior to September 11, the Intelligence Community was neither well organized nor equipped, and did not adequately adapt, to meet the challenge posed by global terrorists focused on targets within the domestic United States. Serious gaps existed between the collection coverage provided by U.S. foreign and U.S. domestic intelligence capabilities.

The U.S. foreign intelligence agencies paid inadequate attention to the potential for a domestic attack. The CIA’s failure to watchlist suspected terrorists aggressively reflected a lack of emphasis on a process designed to protect the homeland from the terrorist threat. As a result, CIA employees failed to watchlist al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi. At home, the counterterrorism effort suffered from the lack of an effective domestic intelligence capability. The FBI was unable to identify and monitor effectively the extent of activity by al-Qa’ida and other international terrorist groups operating in the United States. Taken together, these problems greatly exacerbated the nation’s vulnerability to an increasingly dangerous and immediate international terrorist threat inside the United States.